What If The USSR Had Invaded Norway In 1940?

This is another counter-factual posting prompted by one of the interviews that W.P. Crozier conducted between 1933-43 with politicians and ambassadors that I have recently read in a collection. The concern that the USSR would overcome Finland and then advance into Norway, at least as far South as Narvik was expressed in December 1939 by Count Eduard Reventlow, the Danish ambassador to London 1938-47. Of course to reach Norway, the USSR first had to conquer Finland which the Soviets tried to late in 1939. In September 1939, in line with the Nazi-Soviet Pact, two weeks after the German invasion of western Poland, the Soviets had successfully seized eastern Poland. The Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania came increasingly under Soviet control; under Soviet military occupation in June 1940 and were annexed to the USSR in August 1940.


Finland had been conquered by Russia in 1809 and formed an autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire until breaking away in 1917. In 1939, the Soviets demanded territorial concessions from Finland, including the ceding of the Finnish Karelian area North of Lake Lagoda and on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Finland; ceding of Salla farther North; the Rybachi Peninsula on the northern coast; islands in the Gulf of Finland and a 30-year lease on Hanko on the coast of South-West Finland. Finland refused and the Winter War began on 30th November 1939 with a Soviet invasion of Finalnd. It ended on 13 March 1940 with the Treaty of Moscow. In November 1939 the Soviets and probably the bulk of the world expected Finland with a population of less than 5 million against the USSR with 170 million, to be defeated quickly just as Poland (with a population of 35 million people) had been, i.e. just over a month. However, this was not to be the case. Partly it had to do with the climate, attacking in this region in the winter was going to be hard for any force. However, even in the summer of 1944 when the Soviets again tried to invade the country they were repulsed. In the Lapland War of September 1944-April 1945 the Finns expelled the Germans from northern Finland. Besides the Italians, the Finns were the only country to fight both sides in the war simultaneously.


The Finns fielded around 340,000 soldiers in 1939 with 32 tanks and 114 aircraft. The Soviets initially committed 450,000 soldiers and throughout the war somewhere between 2,500-6,500 tanks, certainly around 3,500 Soviets tanks were destroyed and the Soviets lost between 260-550 aircraft. Soviet deaths were around 125,000 compared to 70,000 for the Finns, this compared to 1,000 Soviet casualties in the Soviet invasion of Poland. The Soviets hoped to use blitzkrieg tactics, but the terrain with a lack of paved roads and fragmented by forests, lakes and swamps made this impossible, Good Finnish analysis of the few narrow routes the Soviets could proceed along made defence along the so-called Mannerheim Line (named after Field Marshal Baron Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, Marshal of Finland, Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Defence Forces, former Regent and later President of Finland) incredibly difficult to break, even though it was primarily made of log lined dugouts and trenches which would have looked unsophisticated even in 1918. There were 221 strong points along the Karelian peninsula but with only one concrete bunker per kilometre this was hardly the Maginot Line.


The Finns lacked ammunition and had few working tanks. With more equipment and supplies they could have inflicted even heavier damage on the Soviets especially through saturation artillery fire. The Finns proved innovative, using the frontal attack by Soviet tanks through the difficult terrain to their advantage and using logs and petrol bombs to disable the tanks. The Finns had camouflaged uniforms for the winter fighting but this was only introduced for the Soviet forces in January 1940 making them more obvious to the defenders up until then. The winter of 1939/40 was particularly cold with record low temperatures as low as -43oC in one location. The Red Army must have been aware of the potential conditions, but some units lacked sufficient winter clothing and Soviet soldiers died from frostbite. The icy conditions did allow Soviet vehicles to get over swamps rather than be bogged down in them.


The Finns sensibly used guerilla tactics on isolated Soviet units. Some of the units seemed to have been ill-trained and certainly lacking in experience. The Soviets' own propaganda undermined morale by portraying the Finns as killing any prisoners taken and the Mannerheim Line being an equivalent of the Maginot Line. The purges by Stalin in the late 1930s had removed experienced officers from the Red Army, though this does not seem to have had much impact on the success in Poland earlier in 1939. The key flaw on the Soviet side seems to have been over-confidence and not appreciating properly that the terrain of Finland was extremely different from that of Poland. To a great extent this was probably due to the purges too as no officer would be willing to challenge the view of his superiors without fear of being arrested. Even after the Germans invaded the USSR in June 1941, Stalin continued to purge high-ranking officers.


Despite the German-Soviet invasion of Poland, much of the focus of the British and French was on the Soviet assault on Finland. In part this dated back to their mistrust of the Communists that had led to the Intervention by both countries in 1918-19. Whilst the French made only a feeble invasion of Germany in September 1939 and withdrew in November, plans were made to intervene against the USSR in the Caucasus as a way to get back at Soviet aggression in Finland. The British considered intervening in Finland through cajoling Norway and Sweden to give access across their territories. The long-term consequences of a war between Britain and the USSR in Scandinavia was noted by Björn Prytz, the Swedish ambassador to London 1938-47, speaking to W.P. Crozier in January 1942. He felt that it had been beneficial for the world that Sweden had not permitted British forces to cross Swedish territory to aid the Finns during the Winter War, because this would have brought the British to war with the USSR making it far harder, if not impossible, for an alliance to be formed between the two countries when the Germans invaded the USSR in June 1941.


As it was the Germans had threatened to invade Sweden if the country permitted the transit of British forces. This would have triggered a general war across Scandinavia in one of the harshest winters that the region had experienced. Given the British experience in Norway it seems likely that the Germans would have conquered both Sweden and Norway by Spring 1940. However, a protracted war and a whole new front may have had repercussions for the German invasion of western Europe in May-June 1940. The Swedes would not risk their neutral position and the British and French were left not being in a position to support Finland. Around 12,000, primarily right-wing, volunteers did travel there in order to fight the Soviets; 8,700 came from Sweden, 1,000 from Denmark, 700 from Norway and even 350 from the USA. One British volunteer was a cousin of Winston Churchill who had already fought for the Nationalists in Spain. The change of the Soviet command and a focus on a small section of the Mannerheim Line from January 1940 paid off for the Soviets and by February the Finns were retreating. The war effectively came to an end in March 1940 though Soviet progress had been limited. With the thaw it is likely it would have been slowed further.


The Soviet advances in 1940 meant that they may not have conquered the country but they came out 'winners'. The failure in Finland was damaging the reputation of Stalin's regime despite its totalitarian control and it seems Stalin simply wanted out of the war. The Treaty of Moscow was face saving exercise though Soviet foreign minister Molotov claimed that the kind of territory gained by the USSR was all that had been sought as it gave protection to Leningrad, the USSR's second city. What was ceded by Finland was pretty much what the Soviets had demanded in 1939. Finland lost 11% of its territory and 30% of its resources. Despite Molotov's claim, the Soviets had formed a puppet government, the Finnish Democratic Republic in December 1939 and this was clearly intended to replace the Finnish government once the entire country had been conquered just as the Soviets were to do across eastern Europe 1944-8.


The defeat by the Soviets meant that Finland also became drawn more into Germany's circle so that in 1941 when the Germans invaded the USSR, the Finns did too. The relationship remained ambivalent and whilst the Finns were on the Leningrad front they would often not allow the Germans to attack from their zones and certainly seemed unwilling to advance any great distance from the Finnish border. The Soviets learnt from the Winter War and the Red Army reduced the role of its political commissars and reinstated the traditional army ranks. Winter tactics and clothing were slowly improved. In combating the German invasion, the Soviets initially seemed not to apply any of the lessons of the Winter War even in the regions with terrain like that of Finland. It was only with the arrival of the Siberian forces to defend Moscow and the work of the partisans that the Soviets used the kind of tactics that had enabled Finland to hold out so long against vastly superior forces.

Let us assume now, that in line with the original Soviet plans, the whole of Finland was overrun by the Red Army within two weeks. This may have been feasible with the use of paratroopers or amphibious landings combined with more sophisticated tactics and a proper recognition of the Finnish terrain which was very much like a lot of the country in western Russia anyway. With less arrogance and more planning perhaps the Soviets with their air and tank superiority let alone the greater numbers could have smashed the Finnish defences, especially if the invasion had come in September rather than the end of November. Let us assume that, say in November 1939, the Finnish Democratic Republic, effectively the first Soviet bloc satellite country is established. Finland now the friend of the USSR cedes all the territory that the USSR demanded and signs a military alliance, building on the non-aggression pact signed in 1934 anyway. Immediately this would have shifted the balance in Scandinavia with the Soviets now on the border of Sweden with its iron ore reserves vital for Germany and in the far North, with Norway, whose control is of great concern to Britain.


Count Reventlow believed that the next step would have been the Soviet invasion of Norway. This would have immediately brought tension to the Nazi-Soviet pact. The Soviets could invade by sea and with difficulty over the narrow land border, without having to cross Swedish territory. A deal may have been struck with the Germans to divide Norway, with the Soviets keeping Narvik and all regions North of that and the Germans having the rest. The trouble is that Narvik is at the head of the railway bringing Swedish iron ore, mined at Kiruna and Malmberget to the sea. The iron ore ships went along the North Sea coast to Germany not across the Baltic Sea, though it was possible to ship it out from the Swedish port of Lulea on the Baltic. However, Narvik was the location both sides wanted, the Germans to maintain the iron ore route, the Soviets to have a naval base effectively opening out towards the Atlantic. If the Soviets had quickly defeated Finland they may have simply rolled straight on to Norway. I doubt the Germans would have sat back and may have launched an assault of the country too and probably Sweden as well, given how sensitive they were about anyone going into Sweden. It also seems they had plans to invade Sweden in 1939/40 if the British and French invaded Norway in an effort to support Finland. On 5th February 1940 a Franco-British plan of sending 100,000 British and 35,000 French troops to Narvik effectively to seize Norway and much of Sweden too, was set out. Hitler had declared in December 1940 that Franco-British intervention in Sweden would bring an immediate German invasion. The British were still offering 20-50,000 troops to Finland up to the end of the Winter War.


Following the end of the Winter War Britain formulated plan R4 which was another invasion of Norway. The British hoped to provoke a German assault on Norway by mining neutral Norwegian waters and then sinking iron ore ships travelling to Germany. The Germans were pretty much aware of British plans and invaded Norway at the start of April 1940. The British plan was pathetic to the earlier one, with only 18,000 troops assigned to Narvik. As I have considered before: http://rooksmoor.blogspot.com/2008/01/what-if-german-invasion-of-western.html the British and Norwegians could have defeated the Germans in Norway or at least tied them down long enough to affect the invasion of western Europe. However, despite British handling and almost expelling the Germans from Narvik at one stage the intervention was a failure and was superseded by the German invasion of the Netherlands and Belgium then France; the last British troops left Norway on 8th June 1940.


It seems very feasible that a Soviet advance towards Norway would have provoked a stronger reaction. The British were aiming to send at least 20,000 if not 100,000 troops to fight the Soviets in Finland but for some odd reason seem to want to provoke a German invasion of Norway which by definition would have put the British on the back foot. This different treatment of the Soviet and the Nazi threats characterised so much of British and French thinking before the Fall of France. It is clear that fear of Soviet expansion was far greater, so a Soviet invasion of Norway would have led to the British to fight there. It seems feasible that conflict could have even broken out between Germany and the USSR over the control of Norway and we could have seen a three-sided war fought out in the country. What seems most likely is that Hitler would have yielded control of at least part of the USSR knowing that ultimately he would defeat the Soviets and would scoop up all that they had gained in 1939 as he was to do in 1941 with eastern Poland and the Baltic States. He may have been happy to see a conflict between Britain and the USSR for Norway. In such a scenario it seems most likely that Sweden would have been invaded immediately by Germany.


Thus, a feasible scenario seems that the Soviets invade Norway in January 1940, them not seeming to have much concern over fighting in the region in winter, especially if they had not had problems taking Finland. The British and French would have invaded Norway and there would have been bitter fighting around Narvik. Despite committing heavier forces than in our 1940, the British and French would still be compelled to retreat having only bought the Germans the time to seize Oslo and Bergen if not Trondheim as well. They would have also quickly conquered Sweden and then had no worries about controlling the iron ore. Given the Nazi-Soviet Pact the iron ore would probably still flow out through Narvik even if this was now in Soviet hands.


The German forces would be slightly more stretched, the Soviet ones much more. Not holding all of Norway would be exchanged for controlling all of Sweden. The interesting difference would come in 1941 with the German invasion of the USSR. Of course, the most effective route was to go through Poland, Belarus and the Ukraine, but it seems like, at least secondary theatres would develop along the German-Soviet line in Norway and across the Swedish-Finnish border. If Britain may have actually fought the USSR in 1940 an alliance between the two countries may have been harder to arrange than it was in our world. However, if we look at how the USSR effectively welcome Finland and Romania into its camp once the tide turned against the Germans, it seems likely that sooner or later the British and Soviets would have worked together. Once the USSR became an ally of Britain it is very likely that the British would have immediately supported the Soviet forces in Norway, opening up a second front three years earlier than happened. Of course, the Soviets may have been expelled from Norway but it would not have been an easy task; with British backing it would have been tougher for the Germans as the Red Army in Norway could have been supported across the North Sea rather than from Archangel and Murmansk. Very likely this would have shifted some of the focus of the war at sea from the Atlantic to the North Sea as the Germans tried to sever the British supply routes to the Soviets.


Even if the British and Soviets were unable to dislodge the Germans from southern Norway the region would become a focus for conflict, threatening to assault Germany through the 'back door' as it struggled towards Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad. It would also allow closer working between the British and Soviets which was something Stalin constantly complained about and it would undercut the complaints he had in our world about the opening of a second front. The focus on the Scandinavian front may have weakened Britain's position in North Africa, though conversely that may have been less of a challenge if more German troops were tied down in Norway. The conflict in Norway may have come to resemble that in Italy in our world with amphibious assaults on the southern Norwegian coast and certainly more naval battles than we saw in our world. Let us assume that by 1943 the British and Soviet forces have made progress against the Germans in southern Norway and have penetrated into Sweden with the aim of crossing the Sound to Denmark. It seems very likely that the invasion would have been focused on northern Germany and perhaps the Netherlands, supported by British and Soviet aircraft from Norway, rather than into France. With Soviet forces pressing the Germans back out of the USSR there would have been a choice to be made, but given with how few troops they potentially could have held Norway then maybe it would have not been a serious one. However, it is interesting to consider that D-Day might have involved an invasion of Jutland.


The Soviet invasion of Norway in 1940 would certainly have tilted the whole focus of the Second World War in western Europe. It seems likely that in the post-war era there would be Soviet pressure for at least a naval base in Norway. Rather than become a member of NATO as happened in our world, Norway is likely to have been treated as Finland and Austria were in our world, neutralised as a kind of buffer state between the western and eastern blocs. A conquered Finland would have remained part of the USSR just as the Baltic States were to do so, only becoming independent in 1991. The Winter War was a minor theatre in the Second World War but the stalemate that occurred during it, effectively meant that Scandinavia (i.e. Norway, Sweden and Denmark) only briefly became the focus of conflict in the Second World War with the fighting much farther South. German troops in Norway even at the end of the war were fighting resistance groups not Allied forces. A quick defeat in Finland in 1939 would have altered the role of the region and brought far greater conflict to it and more suffering to its people. Perhaps part of Norway would have come under Soviet control and Sweden, assuming the Soviets had not invaded it in 1944, may not have had its neutral status in the post-war world but have become a frontline state of NATO. Whilst Count Reventlow's prediction may have been unlikely, it is certainly interesting to see how it would have altered northern Europe if it had come true.